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I. INTRODUCTION

North Pacific salmon originate in the rivers of the United States,
Canada, Russia, and Japan. From these rivers, young salmon swim
downstream to the Pacific Ocean, in which they mature and spend the
vast majority of their lives. After the maturation process is complete,
salmon return to their native rivers, swim upstream to the same area in
which they originated, spawn, and die. Their offspring repeat this cycle.
Salmon stocks are an extremely valuable economic and cultural
resource. In 1995, Alaskan commercial fisheries harvested 993.8 million
pounds of salmon.' In that same year, U.S. salmon exports generated
over $850 million in revenue.2 The value of salmon stocks cannot,
however, be measured solely by the potential to generate income.
Salmon are also an invaluable cultural resource. As one Native American
I tell you what the salmon are worth? The
leader explained, "[h]ow can
3
salmon define who I am."
Because salmon stocks are such a valuable resource, a nation has a
strong incentive to protect those stocks that originate in its rivers. More
precisely, there is an incentive to manage the resource such that its value
to that nation is maximized. And, because there is a present value to
potential future revenue, any attempt to manage salmon stocks must
account for the effects of present decisions on future stocks. If present
stocks are overexploited or under-protected, the value of future stocks is
diminished. Therefore, to maximize the value of its salmon stocks, the
United States has regulated its fisheries and the use of its rivers.4 These
regulations, deemed necessary by lawmakers to maximize
5 the value of
costs.
economic
great
at
imposed
are
stocks,
salmon
U.S.

1.

World Wild Salmon Supply by

Country and Species, Seafood Market

Information Service, Univ. of Alaska, at http://seamarkets.alaska.edu/wild.htm (last
visited Sept. 29, 2002).
2. U.S. Salmon Exports: Annual Value of Exports, by Product, Seafood Market
Information Service, Univ. of Alaska, at http://seamarkets.alaska.edu/us-exportvalue_
htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2002).
3. Thomas C. Jensen, The United States-Canada Pacific Salmon Interception
Treaty: An Historicaland Legal Overview, 16 ENVTL. L. 363, 368-69 (1986) (quoting
Antone Minthorn).
4. See Kelly R. Bryan, Note, Swimming Up Stream, Trying to Enforce the 1992
North Pacific Salmon Treaty, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 241, 243 (1995) ("Each year,
federal and state governments spend over $300 million to maintain and improve salmon
runs in the Pacific Northwest." Id.).
5. Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North
Pacific Ocean, Feb. 11, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Jap.-Russ., S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-30 1
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 Convention] (The agreement was drafted "[r]ecognizing
that States of origin of anadromous stocks make expenditures and forego economic
development opportunities to establish favorable conditions to conserve and manage
those stocks." Id.).
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Fish, however, do not recognize political borders. This being the case,
salmon stocks that originate in U.S. rivers often migrate into the open6
ocean and beyond the exclusive economic zone of the United States.
Once on the high seas, salmon stocks become a common resource,
subject to the international customary law that all nations have the
freedom to fish the high seas. Thus, absent any specific agreements that
preempt this customary law, fishing vessels from other nations can
exploit these salmon stocks in a manner deemed unsustainable by the
United States.' Such exploitation can undermine the efficacy of U.S.
measures designed to promote the maximum sustainable yield of the
salmon stock, and can create disincentives to regulate (or even
incentives to deregulate) in the United States.8 In effect, this disparity
between regulations that apply within the United States and those that
apply on the high seas creates a problem of the commons that, if left
unchecked, could lead to the irreversible depletion of the salmon stock.9
A. The Tragedy of the Commons
Aristotle observed that "[w]hat is common to the greatest number has
the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own,
hardly at all of the common interest."' In 1968 Garrett Hardin examined
the system of incentives that leads to this "careless" exploitation of a
common resource, and coined the phrase "the tragedy of the commons"
to describe the overexploitation of that resource. I
A tragedy of the commons is characterized by a limited common
resource that is exploited by several independent users. In this situation,
each user has an incentive to exploit that resource until their short-term
profits are maximized. This incentive continues to exist in the face of
6.

See id. at 1-2.

7.
8.

Cf id. at 1.
See Bryan, supra note 4, at 242 ("Coastal States create and implement

conservation plans for their own salmon stocks ....Therefore, high seas catches of
salmon from different states-of-origin interfere with the management efforts of those
states." Id.). See also Jensen, supra note 3, at 371.
9. Cf Jon L. Jacobson, The New Internationalizationof North Pacific Fisheries,
6 WILLAMETITE J. INT'L L. & DisP. RESOL. 1,3 (1998).
10. Barton H. Thompson, Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 242 n.2 (2000) (quoting ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 33 (Steven Everson ed. & Benjamin Jowett trans., 1996),
quoted in ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1990)).

I1. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).

diminishing total benefits to society, and even, perhaps, at the expense
of personal profits in the long run. The incentive to overexploit is
based on the idea that the benefit of using one more unit of the
resource will go entirely to its user, while the cost (of depleting the
common resource beneath the level of maximum yield) will be
dispersed among all users. This incentive operates on all users, and
results in a race between those users to exploit the resource until it
becomes prohibitively expensive to do so.
The incentive to overexploit is complemented by several factors that
deter concerned users of a common stock from unilaterally abstaining
from the race to exploit. Because the burden imposed on the common
resource by each user is frequently insignificant, the benefit to society of
unilateral abstention would be, just as frequently, minimal. 12 Furthermore,
the meager benefits of unilateral abstention accrue to all users, but are
achieved at costs that fall solely on the individual actor. These factors
are compounded by the fear that other users, who are still racing to use
as much of the resource as possible, will pick up the slack and thereby
negate any societal benefits of abstention.3
If left unchecked, this system
of incentives tends towards the collapse
4
of the common resource.'
B. Privatizationas a Solution to the Tragedy of the Commons
One way to alleviate the overexploitation of a common resource is to
privatize it, such that one entity has an enforceable right to exclude
others from exploiting that resource. If an entity has such a right, and
retains the right to exploit the resource, that entity will internalize the
costs of mismanagement. Consequently, the externalities and incentives
that tend towards the collapse of a common resource will be extinguished,
and a tragedy of the commons will be averted.
C. Regulatory Solutions to the Tragedy of the Commons
Regulating the use of a common resource can also obviate the externalities
that cause the problem of the commons.1 5 The argument in support of a
regulatory solution runs in the following way:

12.

Thompson, supra note 10, at 242.

13.

Id. at 245.

14.

See Hardin, supra note 1I, at 1244.

15. Id. at 1245 ("The tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by
private property, or something formally like it. But the air and waters surrounding us
cannot readily be fenced, and so the tragedy of the commons as a cesspool must be
prevented by different means, by coercive laws or taxing devices." Id.).
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If. (1) a governing body sets a iimit on the use of a common resource such that,
if the limit is adhered to, the total use of the resource would not exceed the
value maximizing level, and (2) either: (a) (the risk of non-compliance with the
regulation)16 exceeds (net benefit of non-compliance),' 7 or (b) the regulation is
self enforcing, 18 then, (3) users will not exploit past the level at which the
marginal benefit equals the marginal cost.

This argument rests on two main premises. The first premise has to
do with the level of exploitation permitted by the regulatory scheme. If,
in spite of the regulation, users can legally exploit a resource beyond the
the value maximizing level, then the regulation cannot, by itself, preclude
the overuse of the common resource (hereinafter, this premise will be
referred to as the "exploitation condition").
The second premise has to do with the level of deterrence achieved by
the regulation (hereinafter, this premise will be referred to as the
"deterrence condition"). Absent sufficient deterrence, the same system
of incentives that gives rise to the problem of the commons will also
encourage users to disregard the regulations. These incentives will be
avoided if the risk of non-compliance outweighs the benefit of exploiting
beyond the regulatory mandates. Note also, however, that such regulations
may be self-enforcing when each user believes that all other users will
adhere to the regulation. If a user either: 1) maximizes her personal
profits from the resource in the long-run when she and all other users
abstain; or, 2) internalizes the benefit to society of precluding the
tragedy of a common resource such that the benefit to the user of
avoiding the tragedy outweighs the foregone profits of non-compliance,
then the user will adhere to the regulation.' 9 However, if a user does not
believe that other users will also comply, she will be unwilling to
comply unilaterally because the benefits of her unilateral compliance
will be outweighed by the opportunity costs of compliance.
16. The risk of non-compliance equals (probability of being caught) multiplied by
(the severity of the penalty if caught).
17. The profits that a user would accrue if she did not adhere to the regulation.
18. A regulation aimed at solving a problem of the commons will be self-enforcing
if all users believe that other users will adhere to the regulations, and each user either: 1)
adheres to the standard out of a fear that, if she does not adhere, other users will not
adhere; or, 2) chooses to promote society's welfare (instead of their immediate personal
profit) by adhering to the government's standard when they believe that all other users
will also abstain.
19. But see generally Matt Ridley & Bobbi S. Low, Can Selfishness Save the
Environment?, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 1993, 76, 78 (claiming that a problem of the
commons will rarely be solved if it relies upon this idea of abstaining for the "collective
interest". Id.).

The two main premises of this argument constitute necessary
conditions for a regulatory solution to the problem of the commons. If
either of these conditions is not met, the proposed regulatory solution
will not succeed.
D. North Pacific Salmon Stocks and the Tragedy of the Commons
Salmon stocks that are subject to exploitation by more than one nation
are victim to the system of incentives that operates on users of common
resources on two levels. 20 On the primary level, these incentives
encourage individual vessels to race to catch as many fish as possible.
Note that on this level, each vessel's flag state is best situated to mandate
or induce that vessel to limit its catch.
However, a flag state has no incentive to create such mandates or
inducements. To the contrary, nations with North Pacific salmon
fisheries are subject to a secondary level of incentives that reinforces
those incentives operating on individual vessels. That is, nations have
an incentive to allow their fisheries to exploit the common salmon stock
in a manner unimpeded by national regulations. The capture of one ton
of fish by a nation's fisheries benefits that nation, while the cost of
depleting the salmon stock is borne by all nations who exploit the
resource. Furthermore, a nation's fear that any unilateral decision to
protect the salmon stock will be rendered futile by other nations that pick
up the slack tends to prevent any such regulations. 21 Thus, nations that
exploit salmon stocks have incentives to allow their fisheries to
overexploit that stock, and nations in which salmon stocks originate, or
to which they migrate, are discouraged from implementing costly
regulations that would protect the stocks.
If nations and vessels act according to these incentives, no nation will
protect anadromous fish stocks that migrate into the high seas or
between exclusive economic zones, no nation will hinder its fisheries'
ability to exploit such stocks, and each vessel will race to catch as many
salmon as is possible. This system of incentives tends inevitably towards
the collapse of the resource. To prevent such a tragedy, the incentives
that operate on nations and on individual fisherman must be addressed.
However, each nation is best situated to remedy the incentives operating
on its salmon fisheries, yet no nation acting alone has an incentive to do
so. This means that any national attempt to promote the sustainability of
20. Parzival Copes, Sharing the Fishery Resources of the North Pacificfor Mutual
Advantage: Toward an International Management Regime, Simon Fraser U. Dept. of

Econ. Discussion Paper #00-8 (2000), available at http://www.sfu.ca/economics/
research/discussion/dp00-8.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
21.

Jensen, supra note 3, at 371.

[VOL. 4: 543, 2003]

Common Anadromous Stocks
SAN DIEGO INT'L LJ.

anadromous salmon stocks must be preceded by a solution at the
international level.
In fact, the international community has implemented numerous laws
that address the problem of common anadromous stocks of the North
Pacific. The current body of laws addressing this issue operates within
the framework created by the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS). In this comment, I will analyze the UNCLOS
approach to the problem of common anadromous stocks and those laws
that supplement the UNCLOS approach. I will also suggest measures to
bridge the ever-narrowing gap to a viable solution.
R. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA OF 1982

The system of international laws dealing with anadromous stocks of
the North Pacific is built upon the foundation created by the UNCLOS.
The UNCLOS provisions that establish this foundation rely upon the
privatization and regulation of North Pacific salmon stocks.
A. UNCLOS and the PrivatizationApproach
The UNCLOS recognizes that a nation has a limited right to exclude
other nations from harvesting those anadromous stocks that originate in
its rivers. UNCLOS affirms this right in two ways: 1) by codifying a
200-mile "exclusive economic zone" (EEZ) that extends from a nation's
coasts; and, 2) by codifying the "primary interest" principle.
The EEZs codified by UNCLOS extend 200 miles from a coastal
nation's shores. Each coastal state has a right to exclude other nations
from exploiting resources found within that 200-mile zone.22 As a
general rule, this means that a nation has exclusive management
authority over those resources existing within its EEZ.23 Consequent to
this exclusive management authority, a nation in which salmon originate
has an incentive to efficiently manage those stocks that do not migrate
beyond its 200-mile EEZ.
Article 66(1) of UNCLOS codifies the principle that a nation in which
anadromous stocks originate has the "primary interest" in those stocks,

22. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 3d U.N. Conf. on the Law
of the Sea, I Ith Sess., art. 57, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
23. Bryan, supra note 4, at 249.

regardless of where those stocks are located. 24 Exactly what this
"primary interest" entails is not unambiguous. However, it is clear that
its value as a solution to the problem of common anadromous stocks
would be greatest when the right it affords a nation in which such stocks
originate is strongest. 25 Read in this manner, the provision would seem
to recognize that a nation of origin has an absolute right to exclude other
nations from harvesting its salmon stocks. This interpretation is
supported by Article 66(2), which states that a state of origin may limit
the extent to which other nations can harvest its salmon stocks by
establishing a "total allowable catch" for other nations. 6 If applied in
this manner, Article 66(1) would privatize anadromous stocks such that
the nation of origin would internalize all costs of overexploiting or
under-protecting its salmon stocks.
However, Article 66(1) cannot entail an absolute right to exclude.
This is true because: 1) salmon that originate in one nation commingle
with salmon of the same species that originate in other nations; and, 2)
commingling salmon stocks of the same species cannot be distinguished
merely by nation of origin. This being the case, the nation in which one
salmon stock originates-nation A-cannot exclude another nationnation B-from harvesting that stock without excluding B from
harvesting B's stocks of the same species. Because it is absurd to say
that B has a "primary interest" in those stocks that originate in B, yet A
has the power to prohibit B from harvesting those stocks, a nation of
origin's "primary interest" cannot entail an absolute right to exclude.
Although "primary interest" cannot mean an absolute right to exclude,
it does give a nation a heightened interest in those fish stocks that
originate in its rivers. This heightened interest enables a nation of origin
to exclude other states, from which a salmon stock could not have
originated, from harvesting stocks that could have originated within its
borders. 27 Thus, the "primary interest" recognized by Article 66(1) does
enable a nation to exclude, to some extent, other nations from harvesting
those salmon stocks that originate in its borders.
Additionally, the "primary interest" principle enables a nation of
origin to co-manage the stocks that originated in its rivers while those
stocks migrate through the EEZs of other nations. Said another way,
24. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 66(l).
25. The more control that a "primary interest" affords to a nation where
anadromous stocks originate, the more that nation internalizes the costs of overexploiting that stock.
26. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 66(2). If a nation does not have a right to
exclude others from harvesting, it could not impose a "total allowable catch".
27. Bryan, supra note 4, at 252. For example, because no species of salmon
originate in Taiwan, the United States has a right to exclude Taiwan from harvesting any
salmon stocks that could have originated in U.S. rivers. Id.
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Article 66(1) limits the management authority of a nation over nonnative anadromous species found within its EEZ. Article 66(4) seeks
to clarify this relationship between the nation from which an
anadromous stock originates and those nations to which that stock
migrates by mandating that "[i]n cases where anadromous stocks
migrate into or through the waters landward of the outer limits of the
exclusive economic zone of a State other than the State of origin, such
State shall co-operate with the State of origin with regard to the
conservation and management of such stocks. ' 8 Therefore, the
primary interest principle gives a nation of origin the authority to
jointly manage stocks that originate in its rivers while those stocks
migrate through other nations' EEZs.
However, because this "primary interest" cannot entail an absolute
right to exclude, it must follow that Article 66(1) does not, by itself,
obviate the system of incentives that operates on nations that harvest
salmon on the high seas. If a right to exclude is not absolute, then,
absent any further enforceable regulations, some users can exploit
salmon stocks that originate in other nations. Those users would have an
incentive to overexploit because they would not internalize all of the
consequential costs. 29 In light of these factors, the nation of origin
would have a disincentive to protect the resource. So, by themselves,
those UNCLOS provisions that tend towards the privatization of
anadromous stocks cannot preclude a tragedy of the commons. In
recognition of the limitations of these provisions, UNCLOS supplements
them with provisions that regulate the harvest of anadromous stocks.
B. UNCLOS and the Regulatory Approach
UNCLOS Article 66(3) is a regulatory provision designed to
supplement those provisions that recognize a nation's limited right to
exclude others from harvesting salmon stocks that originate in its
borders. Article 66(3) mandates that "[f]isheries for anadromous stocks
shall be conducted only in waters landward of the outer limits of
28. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 66(4).
29. A user has an incentive to continue exploiting a resource until the marginal
costs that accrue to the user equal the marginal benefits of exploiting the resource.
If some of the costs of overexploiting a resource are externalized, and the benefits
of exploiting the resource are completely internalized, then the user will necessarily
have an incentive to exploit beyond the level at which all marginal costs equal the
marginal benefit.

exclusive economic zones, except in cases where this provision would
result in economic dislocation." 30 Thus, if fully enforced, Article 66(3)
would regulate fishing such that no nation could harvest anadromous
stocks on the high seas except those in which the cessation of such
fishing would result in "economic dislocation.'
C. Analysis of UNCLOS
UNCLOS essentially establishes two fronts within which the war to
resolve the problem of common anadromous stocks must be waged. The
first front is on the high seas; the second is within the EEZs of nations
other than the nation of origin.
1. UNCLOS andAnadromous Stocks on the High Seas
Through Article 66(3), UNCLOS employs a regulatory approach towards
the problem of the commons on the high seas. Because it calls for an all
out ban on high seas salmon fishing, Article 66(3) fulfills the exploitation
condition. However, it is unlikely that UNCLOS Article 66(3) fulfills the
deterrence condition necessary for the success of its regulatory approach.
Article 66(3) contains no specific enforcement provisions. Without
specific enforcement provisions, it is difficult to see how the risks of
non-compliance would outweigh the benefits. It could be argued that,
by not adhering to the prohibition against harvesting salmon on the high
seas, a nation risks retaliatory trade barriers or international stigmatization.
However, history suggests that these risks do not outweigh the benefits
of non-compliance. In 1989, Taiwanese fisherman illegally harvested at
least twenty-four million pounds of salmon on the high seas." In 1989,
it was estimated that the costs to society of salmon interceptions on the
high seas could be as great as $500 million per year.33 These facts not
only suggest that the risks of non-compliance do not outweigh the
benefits, but also that Article 66(3) is not self-enforcing. Consequently,
it is unlikely that Article 66(3) meets the deterrence condition necessary
to solve the problem of common anadromous stocks on the high seas.

30. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 66(3).
31. See Bryan, supra note 4, at 249. The exemption for "economic hardship"
initially enabled Japan to continue harvesting salmon on the high seas in spite of the
general prohibition against doing so. Subsequently, however, Japan has ceased targeting
salmon stocks on the high seas in accordance with the general prohibition, and no other
nations have been exempted from that prohibition. Id.
32. Id. at 252.
33. Peter L. Walton, Note, Piracy of North PacificSalmon: Economic Implications
and PotentialSolutions, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 581, 584 (1991).
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2. UNCLOS and Salmon Stocks that Migrate Between EEZs
The second front on which externalities tend towards the depletion of
North Pacific salmon stocks is within the EEZs of nations other than the
nation of origin. The following example illustrates the problem of the
commons as it affects salmon stocks that migrate between EEZs:
stocks regularly migrate through the EEZ of the
(1) Canadian salmon
34
United States.
(2) While these Canadian stocks are within the EEZ of the United States, the
United States exploits those stocks.
(3) Absent any limits on the United States' management authority within its
EEZ, the United States would have an incentive to overexploit Canadian
stocks, 35 and the costs of
36 such overexploitation would, to some extent, be
externalized to Canada.
(4) U.S. overexploitation would undermine the efficacy of Canadian regulations
aimed at promoting the sustainability of Canada's stocks, 37 and this
possibility serves as a disincentive for Canada to protect those stocks. 38
(5) This system of incentives, based on the externalities existing between.
multiple parties that share a finite resource, is the essential characteristic
of a tragedy of the commons.

Article 66(4) addresses the problem of the commons as it applies to
salmon stocks that migrate between EEZs. Article 66(4) states that "in
cases where anadromous stocks migrate into or through the waters
landward of the outer limits of the exclusive economic zone of a State
other than the State of origin, such State shall co-operate with the State
of origin with regard to the conservation and management of such
stocks., 39 This article, however, merely calls for cooperation.40 It was
not intended to be an instrument for extinguishing the bi-national
externalities that exist between the nation where a salmon stock
34. Jensen, supra note 3, at 370.
35. U.S. overexploitation would occur in two situations: I) U.S. fisheries could
target Canadian stocks for overexploitation; or, (2) The United States could negligently
manage those stocks within its EEZ. Note also that, if Canadian legislators merely
believe that the United States is mismanaging those stocks within its EEZ (whether or
not that belief is accurate), Canada will be discouraged from protecting stocks that
migrate between the Canadian and U.S. EEZs.
36. Jensen, supra note 3, at 370-71.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 66(4).
40. Constance Sathre, Salmon Interception on the High Seas: A Continuing
Controversy Between the United States and Japan, 16 ENVTL. L. 731, 753 (1986).

originates and: the nation to which that stock migrates. Instead,
Article 66(4) recognizes that both the nation of origin and the nation
to which a salmon stock migrates have legitimate interests in that
stock, and mandates that those nations work together to manage that
stock efficiently.
3. Anadromous Stocks After UNCLOS
UNCLOS, though it does not resolve the problem of common
anadromous stocks, created a framework within which the problem can
be solved. Success requires that two remaining issues be resolved: 1)
the ban on fishing the high seas for anadromous stocks must be
adequately enforced; and, 2) nations between which salmon stocks
migrate must work together to extinguish the externalities fostered by
their shared resource.
III. ENFORCING ARTICLE 66(3): THE CONVENTION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF ANADROMOUS STOCKS IN THE NORTH PACIFIC

The United States, Canada, Russia, and Japan participated in the 1992
Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North
Pacific (1992 Convention). The 1992 Convention reaffirms UNCLOS
article 66(3) by prohibiting Parties to the Convention from harvesting
salmon on the high seas. 4'
To its credit, the 1992 Convention includes specific provisions that
move somewhat towards making that prohibition more enforceable than
was UNCLOS article 66(3).42 However, these provisions ultimately do
not satisfy the deterrence condition necessary for a regulatory solution to
the overexploitation of salmon stocks on the high seas.
The first shortcoming of the enforcement provisions of the 1992
Convention is an obvious one-the prohibition against high seas fishing
is only binding upon those nations party to the agreement.43 Article IV
of the 1992 Convention addresses the issue of non-party nations, but
does little to solve the problem. It merely calls for the signatory states to
cooperate in dissuading other nations from harvesting salmon in the
Convention area.44 As a result, non-signatory nations continue to overexploit'
41. See 1992 Convention, supra note 5, art. I, at 1.
42. See 1992 Convention, supra note 5, art. V, at 3 (enabling the official of any
party to the convention to board and arrest any vessel reasonably believed to be
harvesting salmon in violation of the Convention). Thus, nations other than a vessel's
flag state, to some extent, can enforce the prohibition against harvesting salmon on the
high seas. Id.). See also Bryan, supra note 4, at 252.
43. See Jacobson, supra note 9, at 2.
44. 1992 Convention, supra note 5, art. IV(4), at 3.
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salmon stocks and to externalize the costs of doing so, and the nations
bound by the 1992 Convention have a consequent disincentive to protect
those stocks.
A second impediment to the successful enforcement of the 1992
Convention's ban on high seas salmon fishing is the vastness of the
North Pacific Ocean.45 Both the United States and Russia use sophisticated
technology to detect salmon pirates on the high seas.4 6 However, the
effectiveness of these measures is undermined by the size of salmon
migratory ranges. 47 Because the level of deterrence achieved by the
1992 ban is directly related to the probability of being caught, and
because the probability of catching a salmon pirate on the vast expanse
of the North Pacific is small, achieving the appropriate deterrence level
is a formidable task.
However, the level of deterrence achieved by a regulation is a function of
the size of the penalty as well of the probability of being caught. Thus, an
appropriate level of deterrence could be achieved in spite of the vastness of
the North Pacific. But the enforcement provisions of the 1992 Convention
proclaim that no entity, other than a vessel's flag state, is permitted to
penalize that vessel for violating the prohibition against harvesting salmon
on the high seas.48 This being the case, a vessel will not be deterred unless
its flag state imposes adequate penalties. 49 However, nations with salmon
fisheries often have an incentive not to deter their vessels from harvesting
salmon on the high seas. 50 Thus, the Convention's attempt to indirectly
address the primary system of incentives that operates on individual vessels,
without first addressing the secondary system of incentives that operates on
the flag state of those vessels, is unlikely to succeed.
IV. IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE 66(4): THE 1985 PACIFIC SALMON
TREATY AND THE 1999 PACIFIC SALMON AGREEMENT

The bi-national problems associated with salmon stocks that migrate
between EEZs are clearly demonstrated by the relationships between the
45. Bryan, supra note 4, at 259.
46. Id. at 257-58.
47. Id. at 258.
48. 1992 Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2)(d), at 4.
49. The prohibition is substantively the same as UNCLOS Article 66(3), which
history has proven not to be a self-enforcing regulation. See Walton, supra note 33, at 584.
50. By allowing its fisheries to violate the high seas ban, a nation would reap the
benefits of other nations' compliance, and would externalize any costs of overexploitation.

United States, Canada, and the North American salmon stocks that
migrate between these two nations. Over the past 90 years, the United
States and Canada have addressed these problems through numerous
bilateral agreements. 5' In 1985, and perhaps in response to the appeal
for cooperation of UNCLOS Article 66(4), the United States and Canada
negotiated the Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST). In response to the
shortcomings of the PST, the United States and Canada supplemented
the PST with the 1999 Pacific Salmon Agreement (Agreement). These
bi-national instruments have approached, yet fallen short of, a lasting
resolution to the problem of the commons as it persists between the
United States and Canada. Through an analysis of these instruments,
however, several potential solutions to the problem become evident.
A. The 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty
Before examining the PST, it may be helpful to re-examine the
externalities that the 1985 treaty was intended to address. Several species of
North American salmon migrate between the EEZs of the United States
and Canada. 52 Acting as a cohesive unit, the United States and Canada
would exploit these salmon stocks such that the value of that resource is
maximized. Furthermore, the United States and Canada would regulate
the use of those rivers from which salmon originate to the extent that the
marginal costs of regulating equal the marginal benefits of a healthier
salmon stock. Consequently, the value of North American salmon stocks
would be maximized, and both nations would be better off.
Conversely, when the costs or benefits of one nation's decisions to
protect (or not to protect) can be externalized to the other nation, both
parties have an incentive to exploit salmon stocks beyond the valuemaximizing level.5 3 For example, Canada has proscribed the creation of
energy generating dams on many rivers in British Columbia.54 The United
States has refused to implement similar restrictions in Washington and
Oregon.55 Consequently, salmon stocks of Canadian origin have flourished
while many species of U.S. salmon are endangered.5 6 The costs of
Canada's regulations are borne entirely by Canada, but the benefits (of
increased harvests) are shared by Canada and the United States.
Similarly, the United States externalizes some of the costs of its decision

51.
Karol de Zwager Brown, Truce in the Salmon War: Alternativesfor the Pacific
Salmon Treaty, 74 WASH. L. REV. 605, 612 (1999).

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 606.
at 611.
at 646-47.
at 646.
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not to protect, but the benefits of that decision are completely internalized.
Consequently, Canada is discouraged from protecting its stocks and both
nations have an incentive to overexploit because they can externalize
some of the costs of doing so. The inevitable consequence of this game
is that everyone is worse off, especially the salmon.
Thus, the challenge facing the drafters of the PST was to create a
binding framework within which the United States and Canada would
internalize both the costs and benefits of their salmon-oriented decisions.
The PST sought to achieve this goal through a regulatory approach that
championed the principles of conservation and equity.57 Through conservation,
the parties sought to "prevent overfishing and provide for optimum
production.,, 58 The equity principle sought to allocate the right to exploit
North American salmon such that each party would "receive benefits
equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters. 59
Although these principles are vague, their successful implementation
would have eliminated the bilateral externalities that undermine an
efficient North American salmon fishery. Conservation requires that the
total level of exploitation not exceed that which would provide for
"optimum production," and equity would ensure that the costs and
benefits of each nation's regulatory decisions would be internalized.
However, the PST proved ineffective because the equity principle was
never implemented according to its plain meaning. The equity principle
as defined by the PST builds upon the notion codified in UNCLOS Article
66(1) that a nation of origin has the "primary interest" in its salmon
stocks. Accordingly, the PST mandates that each party receive all of the
benefits derived from those salmon stocks that originate in its borders.6 °
57. Pacific Salmon Treaty, Jan 28, 1985, U.S.-Can., art. III, T.I.A.S. No. 11, 091
(entered into force Mar. 18, 1985) [hereinafter PST].
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. The equity principle, as defined by the PST, is best illustrated by way of an
oversimplified example. Assume that there is only one species of salmon-Salmon.
Assume further that 100 Salmon will originate in Canadian rivers this year, and that 60
Salmon will originate in U.S. rivers. On the wholesale market, Salmon can be sold for
$10/pound, and the average weight of Salmon equals 1 pound. Finally, assume that the
Conservation principle requires an escapement of 50% to ensure sustainability.
According to the equity principle, Canada is entitled to the value of harvestable Salmon
that originate in its rivers (or $500). Now, because Salmon of U.S. origin commingle
with Salmon of Canadian origin, the equity principle cannot be effectuated through a
mandate that Canada harvest only Canadian Salmon, and that the United States only
harvest U.S. Salmon. Canada will inevitably intercept U.S. Salmon, and vice-versa.
This being the case, the equity principle can only be achieved in two ways: 1) by

Because the equity principle has never been adequately implemented,
the PST has not fulfilled the exploitation condition necessary for a
regulatory solution to the problem of the commons. This failure of the
PST can be attributed to two factors: 1) insufficient procedural
mechanisms; and 2) the tendency for intra-section disputes to impede the
creation of harvest limitations.
1. ProceduralMechanisms of the PST
The PST contains both procedural and substantive provisions. The
substantive requirements of the PST were created in Annex IV. This
annex set short-term limits on the amount of a specific salmon stock that
each nation could harvest. Articles II and IV of the PST establish the
procedural mechanisms by which Annex IV is to be periodically
amended. Article II established the Pacific Salmon Commission
(Commission), and Article IV defined the procedure by which the
Commission could amend Annex IV. The Commission consists of one
Canadian section and one U.S. section. 61 Each section gets one vote and
the power to veto, so any recommendations or decisions made by the
Committee must be consensual.62 Each year, the nation in which a
specific salmon stock originates must submit estimates concerning the
size and management of those stocks for the upcoming year to the
Commission.63 Based on this information, the Commission is required
to recommend "fishery regimes", that, if accepted by the Parties, would
supplant those previous regimes defined by Annex IV. 64
However, the consensus requirement of Article II renders the
Commission impotent whenever the two sections of the Commission
disagree. This situation is exacerbated by the likelihood that the two
sections will be unable to reach an agreement concerning harvest
allocations-neither nation wants their ceiling to be reduced relative to
the other party's, and any reallocation necessarily entails this effect.65
The result has been a perpetual stalemate. Since 1992, the consensus
requirement has thwarted all proposed harvest allocations.66 This

ensuring that there is a balance between the value of Canadian Salmon intercepted by the
United States, and the value of U.S. Salmon intercepted by Canada; or, 2) in the case of
an imbalance in intercepted Salmon, by requiring the nation who intercepts more Salmon
to compensate the other nation for the difference between the other nation's equitable
harvest and its actual harvest.
61. PST, supra note 57, art. II.
62. Id.
63. Id. art. IV.
64. Id.
65. Brown, supra note 51, at 651.
66. Id. at 605.
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procedural failure created incentives for each party to overexploit North
American salmon stocks. The "lack of agreement led to a free-for-all by
each of the parties, as each sought to catch as many fish as possible to67
prevent the other side from benefiting from the breakdown in talks."
Each nation feared that it would not fully internalize the benefits of
unilateral restraint, so neither nation restrained.
Relatedly, the consensus requirement enabled the United States to
misinterpret the equity principle to its own advantage. Throughout the
1990's, Canada alleged that the United States was benefiting from an
interception imbalance, and sought to adjust the Annex IV harvest
allocations accordingly.6 8 The United States was predictably opposed to
such a reallocation, and vetoed Canadian proposals to remedy the
imbalance. In response to Canada's accusation. that the United States
was wielding its veto power in a manner that violated the equity
principle, the United States claimed that an interception balance was not
required by the equity principle. 69 This assertion was primarily founded
on the PST's recognition of "the desirability ... of avoiding undue
disruption of existing fisheries. 7 ° Thus, the Commission could not
reach the consensus necessary to amend Annex IV, and the goals of
equity and conservation have consequently been left unfulfilled.
An obvious way to mitigate the effects of an inter-section stalemate
would be to establish a mechanism for settling disagreements. 71 One
option is an arbitration clause, whereby an arbiter would be empowered
to render binding decisions in the case of intra-Commission disagreements,
thus ensuring the implementation of annual harvest limitations necessary
for the twin goals of equity and conservation. 72 Another option is a
default rule that limits harvests to a greater extent than would the
ceilings to which the parties would likely agree.73 Such a rule would
encourage the parties to negotiate appropriate limits, and would prevent
the race to exploit. 74 Both of these alternatives to the mutual consent
67.
68.

Id. at 651.
Ted L. McDorman, The 1999 Canada-UnitedStates Pacific Salmon Agreement:

Resolved and Unresolved Issues, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 5 (2000).
69. Ted L. McDorman, A Canadian View of the Canada-United States Pacific
Salmon Agreement: A Positive Turning Point? 6 WILLAMEMrE J. INT'L L. & DISP. RESOL.

99, 101 (1998).
70. PST, supra note 57, art III; McDorman, supra note 69, at 100.
71. Brown, supra note 51, at 674.
72. Id. at 675.
73. Id. at 676.
74. Id.

requirement would materially alter the PST and would likely require the
approval of the U.S. Senate,75 but the system created by the PST is
unlikely to be effective as it is written.
2.

The Stakeholder's Veto

The requirement that both sections of the Commission consent to any
proposal prior to its adoption is exacerbated by the composition of the
U.S. section. Each party to the PST appoints up to four commissioners
to sit on its section.76 The Canadian section consists of four representatives,
but is headed by a representative of the federal Department of Fisheries
and Oceans. 77 The other three representatives can make suggestions to
the federal representative, but ultimately the federal representative has
the last word.78
The U.S. section is comprised of one representative from Washington or
Oregon, one from Alaska, one from Native American tribes, and one nonvoting representative from the federal government.7 9 Unlike the Canadian
section, however, the U.S. domestic law implementing the PST mandates
that there be a consensus of these U.S. "stakeholders" before the section
can act. 80 Because the U.S. section must act before the Commission can
act, each U.S. stakeholder holds a power to veto not only intra-section
proposals, but also any proposal that comes before the Commission.
Throughout the 1990's, the composition of the U.S. section was a
stumbling block for achieving the requisite consensus. One reason is
that Alaskan interests are often at odds with the interests of other U.S.
stakeholders. 8' This is due in part to the migratory patterns of North
American salmon. Salmon that originate in the continental United States
and Canada migrate to the Alaskan coast, but salmon from Alaska do not
migrate to the south.82 Consequently, Canada intercepts salmon that
originate in Washington and Oregon, and Alaska intercepts both
Canadian salmon and salmon from the continental United States.83 In
the late 1980s, there was a rough balance between Canadian interceptions
and U.S. interceptions. 84 But, because Canada has protected its western
rivers to a greater extent than has the United States, the abundance of
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 675.
PST, supra note 57, art. II.
Brown, supra note 51, at 630.
Id.
McDorman, supra note 68, at 15.
Id. at 15-16.
Brown, supra note 51, at 642.
Id.
Id.
McDorman, supra note 68, at 5.
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salmon from Washington and Oregon has decreased relative to the
abundance of Canadian salmon. As a result, Alaska's interception of
Canadian salmon has increased relative to Canada's interception of U.S.
salmon. 86 Canada sought to redress this growing imbalance through
Annex IV of the PST. The majority of U.S. stakeholders agreed, in part
to protect the dwindling stocks of Oregon and Washington, that limiting
U.S. interceptions would be an acceptable way to remedy this situation.87
Alaska, however, has wielded its veto power to reject proposals that
would limit its harvests.88 Thus, the U.S. domestic law implementing
the PST enables one stakeholder to block an action by the Commission
that would benefit both Parties to the agreement, and has contributed to
the failures of the PST.
The remedy to this problem is simple in theory but may be impossible
to implement. If the U.S. section were headed by its federal representative,
the federal representative would be able to consent to those proposals
that would benefit the United States without the agreement of every
stakeholder. Such an arrangement, however, may not be possible. The
consensus decision-making process "was instrumental in securing
Senate ratification," 89 and efforts by the federal government to increase
its role in fishery management "have met with fierce resistance." 9° Note
also that the problem of intra-section disputes would be remedied if the
requirement of an inter-section consensus were relaxed or if a decision
forcing mechanism were adopted at the Commission level.
B. The 1999 Pacific Salmon Agreement
Frustrations with the failures of the PST culminated in the salmon
wars between the United States and Canada of the mid-1990s. This
period was marked by desperate attempts by Canada to force the
Commission to arrive at new harvest allocations that reflected the goals
of equity and conservation. 91 Finally, in 1999, the two parties reached
an agreement that, for the moment at least, has defused the situation.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
see id. at

Brown, supra note 51, at 646.
Id. at 640.
Brown, supra note 51, at 642.
Id.
Id. at 632.
Id. at 634.
For a description of the salmon wars between the United States and Canada,
651.

The 1999 Agreement supplements, but does not supplant, the 1985
PST. 92 It does, however, replace Annex IV. 93 Embodied in the substantive
replacements to Annex IV are compromises made by both parties that
made the Agreement possible. Prior to 1999, Canada firmly held to its
belief that the equity principle could not be fulfilled unless there existed
a rough equality of interceptions. 94 In the 1999 Agreement, however,
Canada accepted terms that do not require such a balance.95 In return,
the United States made three concessions. First, the United States
explicitly agreed to reduce its share of the harvest of a few specified
Canadian stocks. 96 Second, the United States agreed to harvest limits
and allocations that, without explicitly reducing the U.S. share of certain
stocks, seem to tend towards that effect.9 7 Finally, the United States
agreed to spend $140 million to create two funds for the conservation
and management of salmon stocks.9 8 These concessions by the United
States tend toward a more equitable interception balance in the future,
and tend to redress Canadian grievances concerning past imbalances.
The concessions by both parties enabled negotiators to replace Annex
IV of the PST with new fishery regimes. Wisely, the negotiators took
the opportunity to essentially change the nature of those regimes
outlined by the original Annex IV so as to prevent the repetition of past
problems. The 1999 Agreement effectuates these changes by creating
long-term limits based on the abundance of each salmon stock.99 Instead
of requiring a consensus each year to establish harvest allocations and
limits, the annual limits under the new regime are a fixed percentage of
the estimated size of each stock for that year.' °° These fixed percentage
limitations, established in 1999, will last between ten and twelve
years. 10' Under this new arrangement, annual harvest allocations depend
less on the policy decisions of an ineffective Commission, and more on
scientific determinations of stock abundance. Thus, the concessions
made by each party allowed for the creation of new harvest allocations,
and the revised form of those allocations ensured that, for at least ten
years, the North American salmon harvests would be limited in a manner
agreed upon by both Canada and the United States.

92.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

McDorman, supra note 68, at 4.

Id.
Id. at 5.
McDorman, supra note 69, at 101.
Id. at 105.
McDorman, supra note 68, at 12-13.
Id. at 6.
McDorman, supra note 69, at 105.
Id.
Id. at 103.
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C. Assessment of 1985 PST and the 1999 Agreement
The 1999 Agreement may have been the surest way to alleviate the
escalating tensions between the United States and Canada, but it does
not resolve any of the fundamental problems of the 1985 PST. The 1999
Agreement neither rejected the consensus decision-making procedure of
the Commission nor adopted a decision-forcing mechanism. Consequently,
the annual stalemate that plagued the Commission is likely to be
replaced by a deca-annual stalemate. Additionally, the substantive terms
established by the 1999 Agreement do not adequately effectuate the
plain meaning of the equity principle. They take a step in the right
direction, but they do not preclude the ability of one nation to externalize
the costs of overexploiting or under-protecting North American salmon
stocks. Thus, the 1999 Agreement, in conjunction with the 1985 PST,
differs in degree, but not in kind, from the 1985 PST standing alone.
The longer-termed fishery regimes of the 1999 Agreement limit the
degree to which success depends upon an ineffective Commission, but
they neither extinguish that dependence nor remove the procedural
shackles that render the Commission impotent. The concessions made
by the United States that enabled the 1999 Agreement to come to
fruition may lessen the degree by which the 1999 harvest allocations
miss the equitable mark, but they do not require the interception balance
necessary for each party to internalize the costs and benefits of their
salmon-oriented decisions.
In spite of these shortcomings, the parties need not jettison the legal
construct created by the 1985 PST and the 1999 Agreement to fulfill
their lofty goals of equity and conservation. Success within the
framework of these legal instruments requires that two steps be taken.
First, the parties must re-assert the plain meaning of the equity principle.
Each nation should, as set forth in Article III of the PST, "receive
benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its
waters.'"10 2 Second, the Parties must replace the consensual decisionmaking process required by Article III of the PST; a new process that
settles inter-section disputes through binding arbitration or through a
default rule would encourage the parties to arrive at appropriate harvest
allocations, and would ensure the creation of new harvest allocations
when the prior allocations expire.

102.

PST, supra note 57, art. III.

V. INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS

The current international laws that address the problem of the
commons as it pertains to salmon stocks of the North Pacific operate
within the dual-front framework established by UNCLOS, but fall short
of a true solution to the problem. The ban on high seas salmon harvests
is still inadequately enforced, and the bi-national externalities existing
between nations of origin and those nations to which salmon stocks
migrate persist. Separate solutions to these issues are achievable within
the UNCLOS framework. There is, however, an alternative to working
within the current legal regime. A comprehensive system of Individual
Transferable Quotas (ITQ) would provide a uniform solution to the
problem of the commons associated with salmon stocks on the high seas
and with stocks that migrate between exclusive economic zones.
An ITQ is essentially a permit to harvest a pre-determined percentage
of the total salmon supply.' 03 An owner would be entitled to his ITQ in
perpetuity, but could transfer it at will."°4 0And
only ITQ owners (or
5
lessees) could legally harvest salmon stocks.1
For the purposes of this comment, an ITQ system could be
implemented in three over-simplified steps: 1) discern the abundance and
escapement requirements of each salmon stock; 2) allocate ITQs between
the United States, Canada, Russia, and Japan such that the number of
ITQs each nation receives reflects the value of the salmon that originate
in its rivers minus the escapement goals for its stocks; 10 6 and, 3) allocate
the ITQs intra-nationally among the appropriate stakeholders.
A. An ITQ-Based Solution to the U.S.-CanadianSalmon Disputes
The proper implementation an ITQ system would fulfill both the
equity principle and the conservation principle. If the number of ITQs
initially allocated to both nations accurately reflected the value of those
nations' salmon stocks minus the value of the salmon necessary to
achieve appropriate escapement levels, then both nations would derive
all of the benefits of their salmon stocks. The value of Canada's harvest
would equal the value of all Canadian salmon harvested. The same
would be true of the U.S. harvest, and the equity principle would be
realized. This being the case, each nation would internalize the effects
of its decisions concerning salmon management. If the United States
were to decide to build a hydroelectric dam on a salmon producing river,
103.
104.

Brown, supra note 51, at 678-79.
Id. at 679.

105.

Id.

106.

See id. at 680.
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and the abundance of U.S. salmon consequently diminished, then the
resulting costs of a decreased salmon stock would be internalized by the
holders of U.S. ITQs. Because neither nation could externalize the costs
of salmon mismanagement, both nations would protect their salmon
stocks to the level at which the marginal costs of doing so equal the
marginal benefits. Furthermore, 1TQ owners would serve as conservation
watchdogs because the value of their harvest rights depends on the
abundance of salmon. 0 7 ITQ owners would therefore become lobbyists
for salmon protection, and would make sure that un-permitted salmon
harvests were minimized. Thus, the privatization and conservation
principles would be fulfilled by a well-implemented ITQ system.
A further benefit of the 1TQ system is that, once properly implemented, its
success in fulfilling the goals of equity and conservation would not
depend on achieving a consensus of numerous stakeholders with
conflicting interests. Assuming that the initial escapement goals are adequate,
the only necessary adjustments to annual harvests would be a function of
the abundance of specific salmon stocks. Accurate scientific data concerning
yearly abundance would be necessary to determine the value of each
ITQ, but these factual determinations are unlikely to be as contentious as
were the policy issues facing the Commission in the mid-1990s.
Finally, a properly implemented ITQ system would entail all of the
benefits of a well functioning market. Each ITQ would eventually go to
the person who could harvest that quota most efficiently. Marginal fishermen
would, to their benefit, sell their quotas and get out of the industry. The end
result would be a net gain in utility for both the United States and Canada.
Despite these benefits, recent history suggests that the United States
would be unwilling to accept an ITQ system. The initial implementation
of an ITQ system would require the United States to agree to the
equitable allocation of ITQs between the United States and Canada.
But the equitable allocation of harvest rights is exactly the issue upon
which the Commission has been unable to agree. Therefore, unless the
United States could pass a new treaty through the Senate that does not
require a consensus among all U.S. stakeholders, it is unlikely that the
United States would agree to the equitable allocation of ITQs necessary
for a successful ITQ system. Note also that if the United States could
pass such a treaty through the Senate, then it would also be possible to
realize the principles of equity and conservation within the framework of
107.

Id. at 684.

the 1985 PST and the 1999 Agreement. However, a well-implemented
ITQ system would still be preferable to a solution within the current
legal framework because of the efficiencies that inhere in a market based
system, and also because an international ITQ system could be used to
mitigate the problem of common salmon stocks on the high seas.
B.

ITQs and Salmon Piracyon the High Seas

An ITQ regime would help deter nations and vessels from acting upon their
incentives to illegally harvest salmon on the high seas in two distinct ways.
First, an ITQ system would give greater incentives for a flag state in
which salmon stocks originate to deter its vessels from harvesting
salmon on the high seas. Nations where salmon originate would be
allocated ITQs according to the value of those salmon that originate in
its rivers minus the escapement goals for its stocks. When a stock is
under-protected, the value of a nation of origin's ITQs is diminished.
Nations where salmon originate will seek to avoid this diminution of the
value of their salmon harvests through good management of its salmon
stocks. Furthermore, ITQ owners within a nation of origin will encourage
their government to maximize the value of national salmon stocks
because the value of each ITQ is a function of the size and sustainability
of that nation's salmon supply. Consequently, nations of origin will have a
greater incentive to manage their stocks so as to achieve the maximum
sustainable harvest level. And, because salmon on the high seas have not
yet matured and the capture of these immature fish significantly undermines
the value of future salmon stocks, 0 8 nations where salmon stocks originate
will have a greater incentive to deter high seas salmon harvests.
Second, an ITQ regime would entail a ticketing system that prohibits
the sale of salmon caught without an ITQ.' 0 9 Under this system, each 1TQ
owner would be given tickets that correspond to her permitted harvest
level for a given year, and would be prohibited from selling her catch to
dockside processors without transferring the appropriate number of
tickets to the purchaser." 0 These processors would then be required to
file those tickets so that enforcement agents would be able to compare
the processor's records with the tickets they have filed."' If the system
worked perfectly, salmon pirates would be unable to find buyers for their

108. Walton, supra note 33, at 595 ("It has been estimated that every pound of fish
taken on the high seas would produce three to six pounds of fish inshore." Id.
Furthermore, "because these fish never have the opportunity to spawn and reproduce, the
future productivity of the fishery is threatened." Id.).
109. Brown, supra note 51, at 682.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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illegal harvests because processors would be unwilling to run the risk of
being caught marketing salmon without tickets. And even if the system
did not work perfectly, it would make harvesting salmon illegally a less
profitable endeavor, and salmon pirates on the margin would turn to
other pursuits.
VI. CONCLUSION

The problem of the common anadromous stocks of the North Pacific is
currently addressed through a legal regime operating within the framework
established by the UNCLOS. This legal regime operates on two distinct
fronts, but the externalities and incentives that define a problem of the
commons continue to exist on both fronts. On the high seas, inadequate
enforcement enables vessels and nations to violate the ban against high
seas salmon harvests and to externalize the costs of doing so. Within
EEZs, ineffectual bi-national treaties enable nations to which salmon
stocks migrate to overexploit salmon stocks that originate in other
nations, and to externalize the costs of doing so. It may be possible to
eliminate these problems within the current legal regime. However, a wellimplemented system of ITQs could provide a more cohesive, comprehensive,
and efficient mechanism for resolving the externalities and incentives
that continue to plague the salmon stocks of the North Pacific.
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M. Carr Ferguson, B.A., LL.B., LL.M., Visiting Professor
Ralph H. Folsom, A.B., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
C. Hugh Friedman, A.B., J.D., LL.D., Professor of Law
Kevin J. Greene, B.A., J.D., Visiting Professor
Steven Hartwell, B.S., J.D., Professor of Law
Walter W. Heiser, B.A., J.D., LL.M. Professor of Law
Jane Henning, B.A., J.D., M.A., Visiting Professor
Gail Heriot, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Paul Horton, A.B., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
Yale Kamisar, A.B., LL.B., LL.D., Professor of Law
Michael B. Kelly, B.G.S., M.A., J.D., Professor of Law
David Laro, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Visiting Professor
William H. Lawrence, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Herbert I. Lazerow, A.B., J.D., LL.M., D.E.S.S., Professor of Law
Dennis Lilly, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Visiting Professor
Shaun P. Martin, A.B., J.D., Professor of Law
Grayson M.P. McCouch, A.B., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
Matthew McCubbins, V.A., M.S., Ph.D., Visiting Professor
John H. Minan, B.S., M.B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Jean Montoya, A.B., J.D., Professor of Law
Grant H. Morris, A.B., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
Virginia E. Nolan, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
Frank Partnoy, B.A., B.S., J.D., Professor of Law
Theresa Player, A.B., J.D., Professor of Law
Saikrishna B. Prakash, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Richard C. Pugh, A.B., B.A., J.D., Distinguished Professor

Michael D. Ramsey, A.B., J.D., Professor of Law.
Michael B. Rappaport, B.A., J.D., D.C.L., Professor of Law
Walter B. Raushenbush, A.B., J.D., Visiting Professor
John L. Roche, A.B., J.D., Professor of Law
Daniel B. Rodriguez, B.A., J.D., Dean and Professor of Law
Hon. H. Lee Sarokin, B.A., J.D., United States Circuit Judge, Third Circuit, retired,
Distinguished Jurist in Residence
Maimon Schwarzschild, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Emily L. Sherwin, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Virginia V. Shue, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean and Professor of Law
Bernard H. Siegan, J.D., Distinguished Professor
Steven Smith, B.A., J.D., Warren Distinguished Professor of Law
Thomas A. Smith, A.B., B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Allen C. Snyder, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Lester B. Snyder, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
Lawrence Solum, B.A., J.D. Visiting Professor
Richard E. Speidel, A.B., LL.B., LL.M., Visiting Professor
Edmund C. Ursin, A.B., J.D., Professor of Law
Jorge A. Vargas, J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
Richard Wharton, B.A., J.D., Director, Environmental Law Clinic and Trial Teams
Charles B. Wiggins, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
Mary Jo Wiggins, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
W. Willard Wirtz, B.A. LL.B., LL.D., Professor of Law
Christopher T. Wonnell, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Daniel Yeager, A.B., J.D., LL.M., Visiting Professor
Fred C. Zacharias, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Herzog Research Professor of Law

Lawyering Skills LLMC
Alan Alvord, B.A., J.D., Instructor
Gail Greene, B.S., J.D., Instructor

Lawyering Skills I
Lisa Black, B.S., J.D., Instructor
Elisa Brandes, B.B.A., M.B.A., J.D., Instructor
Nicola Kean, B.A., J.D. Instructor
Toni Martinson, B.S., J.D., Instructor
Heather Murr, B.A., B.S., J.D., Instructor
Leslie Oster, A.B., J.D., Director and Instructor
David Simon, B.A., J.D., Instructor

Administration
Joanne C. Warren, Chairman, Board of Trustees
Alice B. Hayes, B.S., M.S., Ph.D., University President
Francis M. Lazarus, A.B., M.A., Ph.D., Academic Vice President and Provost
Daniel B. Rodriguez, B.A., J.D., Dean and Professor of Law
Virginia V. Shue, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Graduate
Programs and Professor of Law
Kevin Cole, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean and Professor of Law
Carrie Wilson, B.A., J.D., Assistant Dean for Student Affairs
Teresa O'Rourke, B.A., M.Div., Assistant Dean for Academic Planning and Graduate
Programs
Alan Alvord, A.B., J.D., Director, Administrative Hearing Program
Susan S. Benson, B.A., M.S., Director, Career Services
Nancy Carol Carter, B.S., M.S., M.L.S., J.D., Director, Katherine M. and George M.
Pardee, Jr. Legal Research Center
George Decker, B.A., J.D., Director, Law School Publications
Carl Eging, B.A., M.A., Director, Admissions and Financial Aid
Julianne B. D'Angelo Fellmeth, B.A., J.D., Administrative Director, Center for Public
Interest Law
Theresa A. Hrenchir, B.A., J.D., Director of Special Projects
Lisa Hillan, B.A., J.D., Practicum and Trial Team Administrator
Kathleen Johnson, B.S., M.B.A., Director, Budget and Administration
Herbert I. Lazerow, A.B., J.D., LL.M., D.E.S.S., Director, Institute on International
and Comparative Law and Professor of Law
Ruth Levor, B.A., M.S.L.S., J.D., Associate Director, Legal Research Center
Adele Lynch, B.A., J.D., Acting Director, Patient Advocacy Program
Janet Madden, B.A., M.A., J.D., Director, Academic Support Program
Donna Matias, B.A., J.D., Director, Entrepreneurship Clinic
Mike McIntyre, B.A., M.A., Associate Campus Minister, Office of University
Ministry
Leslie Oster, A.B., J.D., Director, Lawyering Skills I
M. Susan Quinn, B.A., J.D., Administrative Director, Legal Clinics
Janet Courtney-Smith, Director, Budget & Administration
Roger T. Stattel, B.S., Technology Specialist
Elisa Weichel, B.A., J.D., Administrative Director, Children's Advocacy Institute
Richard J. Wharton, B.A., J.D., Director, Environmental Law Clinic and Trial Teams
Majorie Zhou, B.A., M.A., Registrar
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